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abstract
This thesis begins with the premise that nature is a fundamental operator in the act of poetic
and spatial construction and seeks to develop techniques and propositions for appropriating and
reconfiguring landscape in the production of space.
To investigate this transformation, however, relies not only on a formal/visual interpretation
of topography, but, more critically, on our construction of nature as both a physical and mental
entity. That is, how we construct our knowledge of and through nature is fundamental to
reconsidering terms of engagement and overlap, and for exploring potential relationships and
affinities. Any investigation of the transformation of landscape, therefore, begins with its
construction.
Consequently, this thesis assumes two si(gh)tes of construction. Theoretically, the
investigation is sited in transcendentalist literature/thought, beginning with two essays
entitled "Nature" by Ralph Waldo Emerson that address our relationship to the natural world
and its role experientially(spatially) and poetically. Physically, the project examines the
production of a series of spaces/interventions on Salt Meadow, Cape Cod, Massachusetts as a
concurrent means of investigating the transformation of nature in the production of space. These
two parallel investigations are not causally related, but mutually reinforcing modes of
investigating and reflecting on space and spatial experience through the use of nature as a
ground of investigation.
Thesis Supervisor: Ann M. Pendleton-Jullian
Title: Alfred H. and Jean M. Hayes Career Development Professor of Architecture
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a note to the reader on the structure of the work
The focus of this work has been the development of a series of spaces through a process of
mapping and operating in the physical site. The resulting series of maps, models, drawings and
collages serve as the primary text of the thesis.
This visual text is bracketed by supplementary texts, both visual and written, each of which
explores and elaborates themes pursued in the architectural work. These are not descriptive of
the constructions, rather they establish the intellectual and visual foundations on which the
spatial work has been pursued.
The eye is the first circle and the horizon
which it forms is the second, and throughout
nature this primary figure is repeated without
end.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Circles
An exercise in viewing the world.
On the motive! But one looks at the sea
As one improvises, on the piano.
Wallace Stevens, Variations on a
Summer Day
prologue
Constructing Emerson's Nature
"I only wish to indicate the true position of nature in regard to man, wherein to
establish man, all right education tends; as the ground which to attain is the object
of human life, that is, of man's connection with nature."'
In the introduction to each of his two essays "Nature" (1836, 1844), Ralph Waldo Emerson
established the necessity for the direct experience of nature as a means of articulating an
original relationship to the world (through poetry) not bound by the constraints of the past.
Nature was, for Emerson, a privileged site for this investigation not conditioned by (limited by)
history, church or state, but operating instead as an experiential and experimental ground. 2
Underlying his bias for the natural world as a site for experiential investigation was the belief
in the correspondence between the natural and the supernatural (spiritual) worlds. This
immediate relationship responded to the moral need to find meaning (purpose) in the material
world beyond sensual experience (the surface of existence)3 such that "[e]very object rightly
seen unlocks a new faculty of the soul."4 Correspondence not only articulated the natural in
terms of the spiritual, but extended to define the relationship between the mental and the
1 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature" (1836) p. 51.
2 In American Fictions, Frederick Karl clarifies the differences between the European and
American search for (construction of) identity . European constructions of the self in works of
fiction are often articulated by withdraw and interiority. "European search for self amidst a rooted
"other" leads to phenomenology, the interior space where history is less of a burden." But in
American fiction, it is unlimited space (nature) that is significant. It is not a search for identity
through withdraw, but a search for "a place to attach the self [that] opens up all experience where
the outer reaches are chaotic or disastrous." These differences are not only metaphoric (mental),
but have immediate spatial (and therefore bodily) implications. Frederick Karl, American
Fictions 1940/1980: a comprehensive history and critical evaluation (New York: Harper and Row,
1983) p. 21.
3 Sherman Paul, Emerson's Angle of Vision: Man and Nature in American Experience.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952) pp. 2-4.
4 "Nature" (1836), p. 31.
material. "The fundamental fact in our metaphysic constitution is the correspondence of man to
the world, so that every change writes a record on the mind." ' According to this principle,
sensual experience to transcends physical and material limits.
While this connection of the natural and the supernatural might be dismissed from a
contemporary perspective because of its insistence on the spiritual as a necessary condition for
meaning, it is critical not to overlook how such a construction positions the eye/body relative to
nature, that is, how it constructs experience. For nature becomes a ground whose purpose is to be
experienced and appropriated as a necessary condition for consciousness (because the mental and
the material are immediately attached through the experience of nature.) This construction
does not attribute essences to natural objects (construct the natural world as knowable a priori),
but supposes a process of coming into relationship with nature such that this connection --
between mind and matter, between natural and supernatural-- is realized through experience.
The act of going out and moving through are critical to this construction. Nature is not a passive
site for the reception of (super)natural truths, but a ground for a dynamic experiential process of
locating (positioning) the eye/I. In other words, it is picturesque.6 "The picturesque, far from
being an inner movement of the mind, is based on real land; it precedes the mind in its material
external existence. We cannot take a one-sided view of the landscape within this dialectic. A
park can no longer be seen as 'a-thing-in-itself,' but rather as a process of ongoing relationships
existing in a physical region--the park becomes a 'thing-for-us."7 Through correspondence,
Emerson establishes nature, to borrow Smithson's term, as a thing-for-us, positioning the body
5 Ibid., p. 32.
6 I am using picturesque here not to denote a picture or a narrative but an experiential (kinetic)
ground. Yve Alain Bois makes this distinction between two modes of constructing the
picturesque: "What does Smithson say? That the picturesque park is not the transcription on the
land of a compositional pattern previously fixed in the mind, that its effects cannot be determined
a prioi, that it presupposes a stroller, someone who trust more in the real movement of his legs
that in the fictive movement of his gaze. This notion would seem to contradict the pictorial origin
of the picturesque, as set forth by a large number of theoretical and practical treatises (the garden
conceived as a picture seen from the house or as a sequence of small views--pauses--arranged
along the path where one strolls)." Yve-Alain Bois, "A Picturesque Stroll around Clara-Clara,"
October29 (Summer 1984) p. 36
7 Robert Smithson, "Frederick Law Olmstead and the Dialectical Landscape" quoted in Bois, p.
36.
and eye moving in space to experience ongoing relationships.'
This reading (construction) of nature as a thing-for-us is not only a conceptual one (based on the
theory of correspondence, because it is spiritually ordained) but is physical (pragmatic), for
nature offers a fundamentally different kind of sensate experience than the city. "Cities give
not the human senses room enough. We go out daily and nightly to feed the eyes on the horizon,
and require so much scope, just as we need water for our bath."9 There is an immediate physical
attachment of the senses (the eye) to the vastness (boundlessness) of the landscape; the eye
demands the panorama, the horizon. This significance of the horizon appears throughout his
writings. "The health of the eye seems to demand a horizon." 0 "We exaggerate the praises of
local scenery. In every landscape the point of astonishment is the point of meeting of the sky
and the earth..."" "People forget that it is the eye that makes the horizon." "
For Emerson, then, positioning the body in nature is more than just a change of scene, for it
significantly shifts the operation of the eye. He diagrams this mode of perception:" "The eye
is the first circle; the horizon the second; and throughout nature this primary figure is
repeated without end."" This connection of the eye to the horizon shifts attention away from
nature as object(s) (as a thing-in-itself) and toward the productive capacity of the eye , to the
visual field, and to the process (act) of seeing (heightens the awareness of nature as a thing-
for-us, the position of the body). "There is a property in the horizon which no man has [owns]
but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the poet"15 Nature demands a new
8 In my room, the world is beyond my understanding,/But when I walk I see that is consists of
three or four hills and a cloud. Wallace Stevens. "Of the Surface of Things," in The Collected
Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York: Vintage Books, 1990) p. 57. Stevens' eye/I,' like
Emerson's, is not contemplative, but voyaging. It is not inside but in motion that the minds' eye
sees.
* "Nature" (1844) p. 318.
10 "Nature" (1836) p. 14.
" "Nature" (1844) p. 312.
12 Emerson, "Experience" (1844) p. 262.
13 Paul, p. 75.
14 Emerson, "Circles" (1841) p.179.
15 "Nature" (1836) p. 7.
(poetic) condition of the eye (vision) in which it is not a possessor of things but is instead an
assimilator of relationships inclusive of and dependent on the eye itself. Ortega Y Gasset,
described such a shift in vision as a shift from the proximate to the distant.
In distant vision we do not fix the gaze on any point, but rather attempt to embrace
the whole field, including its boundaries. For this reason, we avoid focusing the eyes
as much as possible. And then we are surprised to find that the object just perceived--
our entire visual field--is concave. If we are in a house the concavity is bordered by
the walls, the form of a hemisphere viewed from within. But where does the
concavity begin? There is no possibility of doubt: it begins at our eyes themselves.
The result is that what we see at a distance is hollow space as such. The content of
perception is not strictly the surface in which the hollow space terminates, but rather
the whole hollow space itself, form the eyeball to the wall or the horizon.
This fact obliges us to recognize the following paradox: the object of sight is not
farther off in distant than in proximate vision, but on the contrary is nearer, since it
begins at our cornea. In pure distant vision, our attention, instead of being directed
farther away, has drawn back to the absolutely proximate, and the eye beam,
instead of striking the convexity of a solid body and staying fixed on it, glides into a
hollow.16
This vision is analogous to the one which Emerson diagrams in his immediate attachment of
the eye to the horizon." It is not fixed on objects, but dispersed into space, in this state of vision
"everything is background, confused, almost formless."18 And the "formlessness"
(boundlessness)19 of vision in the landscape is significant, for the body and the eye are not
16 Ortega y Gasset, "On Point of View in the Arts," Partisan Review (August, 1949) p. 825.
17 / measure myself/Against a tall tree./l find that I am much taller,/For / reach right up to the
sun,/With my eye;/And I reach to the shore of the sea/With my ear./Nevertheless, I dislike/The way
the ants craw/n and out of my shadow. Wallace Stevens "Six Significant Landscapes," p. 74.
"8 Ortega y Gasset, p. 824.
'9 Formlessness (boundlessness), in Kant's Critique of Judgement, separates the beautiful
from the sublime. Whereas the beautiful "is connected with the form of the object, which consists
in having [definite] boundaries...the sublime, on the other hand, can be found in a formless
positioned among (against) objects, but immersed in and moving through space such that the
strict boundaries between "object" and "subject" dissolve, because they have become one in the
same. 20
This oneness (collapse) with nature is evident in Emerson's description of himself as a
transparent eyeball. "Standing on the bare ground, -- my head bathed by the blithe air, and
uplifted into infinite space, -- all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball; I am
nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle
of God."" This is not only a spiritual, but an aesthetic and spatial experience in which the
boundary between inside and out dissolves. Transparency is a condition of the erasure of
object, so far as in it or by occasion of it boundlessness is represented in it, and yet its totality is
also present to thought." And this formlessness is directly attached to (mental) motion, traversing.
"The feeling of the sublime brings with it as its characteristic feature a movement of the mind
bound up with the judging of the object."
20 This shift from proximate to distant (Ortega y Gasset) or from the object to the horizon
(Emerson) is typically described as a shift from an objective to a subjective model of vision. But
Emerson is not arguing strictly for the subjective, but the trajective. That is, it is not simply subject,
but the act of experiencing that is critical. in his construction of vision (sight) in/of nature. The
trajective does not preference subject or object, but operating (moving, traversing). The term is
borrowed from Paul Virilio, who uses it to describe a state not only of vision, but of being in the
world which operates outside of the objective-subjective model. "Between the subjective and
the objective it seems we have no room for the 'trajective', that being of movement from here to
there, from one to the other, without which we will never achieve a profound understanding of the
various regimes of perception of the world that have succeeded each other throughout the
ages.. .Historically, we thus find ourselves faces with a sort of great divide in knowing how to be in
the world: on the one hand, there is the original nomad, for whom the journey, the beings
trajectory, are dominant. On the other, there is the sedentary man form whom subject and object
prevail, movement towards the immoveable, the inert, characterizing the sedentary urban 'civilian'
in contrast to the 'warrior' nomad." Paul Virilio, Open Sky (New York: Verso, 1997) pp. 24-25
.Accordingly, Emerson's construction of nature can be seen as a resistance to the sedentary
(contemplative) and a preferencing of the nomadic (active) mode of being/ knowing.
21 "Nature" (1836) p. 8.
2 Le Corbusier's described a similar aesthetic condition in The New World of Space. Whereas
Emerson's described his experience in spiritual terms, Le Corbusier articulated it spatially. "We
distinctions, the dissolution of the boundaries between mind and matter; it is concerned with
the synthetic relationship (physically, psychologically) of figures to grounds." Roger
Caillois' compared this merging of figures and grounds to the schizophrenic, who feels as if he
is being devoured by the space around him. "The individual breaks the boundary of the skin
and occupies the other side of his senses He tries to look at himself from whatever point in
space...He is similar, not similar to something, but just similar. And he invents spaces of which
he is the convulsive possession."" What is critical to note in Caillois' description is not only
the act of "breaking the skin," an experience of disembodiment which could be compared to the
experience of transparency, but also that this experience occurs because of the recognition of the
similarity between (resemblance of) two things. (the figure and its ground). Transparency,
according to Emerson, occurs because of the recognition and experience of the similarity of the
mind to nature.
This resemblance is fundamental to the structure of reality, to our being in the world. "It is
easily seen that there is nothing lucky or capricious in these analogies, but that they are
constant, and pervade nature. These are not the dreams of a few poets, here and there, but man
is an analogist, and studies relations in all objects. He is placed in the center of beings, and a
pause, struck by such an interpretation of nature and we gaze, moved by this harmonious
orchestration of space, and we realize that we are looking at a reflection of light.. .This just
consonance is not simply an affect of the subject chosen, it is a victory of proportion....A
boundless depth opens up, effaces the walls, drives away contingent presences, accomplishes
the miracle of ineffable space. I am not conscious of the miracle of faith, but I often live in that
ineffable space, the consummation of plastic emotion." Le Corbusier, The New World of Space
(New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948) pp. 7-8.
23 One might compare the experience of transparency to the sublime, for both are associated
with the experience of 'formlessness'. Kant's describes the spectators' experience of the
sublime: "For there is hee a feeling of the inadequacy of his imagination for presenting the idea of
a whole, wherein the imagination reaches its maximum, and, in striving to surpass it, sinks into
itself, by which, however, a kind of emotional satisfaction is produced." Kant, Critique of
Judgemement, quoted in Bois, p. 60. Transparency, however, is not described in terms of the
contraction of the imagination, but an expansion; this expansion is enabled by resemblance; the
imagination doesn't realize its inadequacy, but instead its connection.
24 Robert Caillois, "Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia," quoted in Rosalind Krauss
"Entropy," in Formless: A User's Guide (New York: Zone Books, 1997) p. 75.
ray of relation passes from every other being to him. And neither can man be understood
without these objects, nor these objects without man."25 This is not simply an act of overlaying a
mental structure onto the material world, nor is it an attempt to decipher essences, but an act of
operative appropriation and interpretation of relationships. This transcends merely looking,
and becomes an operation of the reason26 (imagination), transforming matter into idea through
metaphor (analogy)." "Have mountains, waves and skies no significance but what we
consciously give them, when we employ them as emblems of our thoughts. The world is
emblematic. Parts of speech are metaphors, because the whole of nature is a metaphor of the
human mind."2" Resemblance (and therefore the experience of transparency) is not simply a
belief in the connection of the material and the spiritual, but depends on the poetic condition of
the eye and the act of poetic appropriation."
Wallace Stevens, a twentieth century American poet profoundly influenced by Emerson, argued
25 "Nature" (1836) p. 25.
26 "The Imagination may be defined to be, the use which the Reason makes of the material
world." Nature (1836) p. 45.
27 "To the senses and the unrenewed understanding belongs a sort of instinctive belief in the
absolute existence of nature. In their view, man and nature are indissolubly joined. Things are
ultimates, and they never look beyond their sphere. The presence of Reason mars this faith. The
first effort of thought tends to relax this despotism of the senses, which binds us to nature as if we
were a part of it, and shows us nature aloof, and, as it were, afloat. Until this higher agency
intervened, the animal eye sees, with wonderful accuracy, sharp outlines and colored surfaces.
When the eye of Reason opens, to outline and surface are at once added, grace and expression.
These proceed from imagination and affection, and abate somewhat of the angular distinctness of
objects. If the Reason be stimulated to more earnest vision, outlines and surfaces become
transparent, and are no longer seen; causes and spirits are seen through them." "Nature" (1836)
p. 43.
28 "Nature" (1836) pp. 28-29.
29 Air is air,/lts vacancy glitters round us everywhere./lts sounds are not angelic syllables/ But our
unfashioned spirits realized/More sharply in more furious selves.//And light/That fosters seraphim
and is to them/Coiffeur of haloes, fecund jeweller-/Was the sun concoct for angels or for
men?/Sad men made angels of the sun, and of/The moon they made their own attendant
ghosts,/Which led them back to angels after death. Wallace Stevens, "Evening without Angels,"
p. 137.
that "metaphor" might be more accurately described as metamorphosis. "This word
[metaphor] is used as a symbol for the single aspect of poetry with which we are now concerned-
-that is to say, the creation of resemblance by the imagination, even though metamorphosis
might be a better word." 0 Metamorphosis perhaps more accurately describes the process of
appropriating and manipulating the material world in the production of ideas, in the
(re)making of a world through poetry. This (poetic) reality is constructed not of matter, but of
ideas culled from the relationships in/to matter." This does not negate the existence or the
importance of the material world or sensate experience, for the purpose of experiencing nature is
to "make friends with matter which the schools teach us to despise."" Rather, it asserts that
material experience is not merely an act of reception (an ends), but one of practical
transformation (a means). This idealistic construction of nature renders it not as a solid,
determined objects, but as a ground of potential relationships; as fluid and ductile. "The
greatest value of any method has its power to set the perceivers world in motion, to set him
thinking idealistically""
But motion is not only conditioned by perception and the process of ideation, but is a property of
nature itself. Much of Emerson's writing in "Nature" focuses on its visible and material aspects,
on nature as a ground for (phenomenal) experience through which he articulates (constructs) the
relationship between the eye/I and the natural world (natura naturata). But throughout his
essays, specifically in his second essay "Nature", he addresses the natural world not only as an
experiential ground, but as a "system in transition" (natura naturans)." According to this
construction, "[t]here are no fixtures in nature. The universe is fluid and volatile. Permanence is
but a word of degrees. Our globe seen by God, is a transparent law, not a mass of facts. The law
dissolves the fact and holds it fluid."3 It is consequently not only the act of mental
* Wallace Stevens quoted in David Michael Hertz, Angels of Reality: Emersonian Unfoldings in
Wright, Stevens and Ives (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993) p. 195.
31 Thus the theory of description matters most./It is the theory of the word for those//For whom
the word is the making of the world,/The buzzing world and lisping firmament.//lt is a world of
words to the end of it,/ln which nothing solid is its solid self. Wallace Stevens, "Description
Without Place," p. 339.
32 "Nature" (1844) p. 318.
Emerson quoted in Paul, p. 112.
3 "Nature" (1844) p. 323.
3 Emerson, "Circles" (1841) p. 179.
appropriation that renders the world ductile, but it is in fact a property of matter itself which
is in constant flux, in constant motion. The perceived world is only the (momentary) identity of
a system in dynamic change.
This motion connects all things through a chain of causes, through the 'transparent law' that
organizes all matter (things). According to this construction of nature all material beings are
united through systems, through a nature composed of motion and rest in which "all changes
pass without violence by reason of the two cardinal conditions: boundless space and boundless
time."36 Consequently, every act has its context in a system of causes, and it connected to all
others through a dynamic system. This world is no longer strictly substance, but a series of
processes.
Like the poetic transformation of nature, this system connects us to the natural and renders it
transparent. "The guiding identity runs through all the surprises and contrasts of the piece, and
characterizes every law. Man carries the whole world in his head, the whole astronomy and
chemistry suspended in a thought."3 7 To construct the world as processes is to construct the world
as an idea and therefore immediately attach it to the mind, through mental processes in which
phenomena are realized as systems.
As in the experience of transparency, this positioning within a moving world asserts an
immediate connection to nature and causes us to radically rethink boundaries; to rethink
interiority. "[T]he new molecular philosophy shows astronomical interspaces betwixt atom
and atom, shows that the world is all outside: it has no inside."" But this is not only a
material connection, for the system of organization, the ideal construction of the natural world
as a system, does away with the dualism of body and nature, for it is in this ideal construction
"that we traverse the whole scale of being, from the center to the poles of nature..."39
Re-cognizing the world as a system of motions connects the mind/body to nature not spatially,
but temporally. It is time here, not space, that unites. In this construction, the primary concern
is not to assert the connection of the mind to the natural world but to establish stability within
3 "Nature" (1844) p. 322.
Ibid., p. 324.
" "Experience" p. 255.
39 "Nature" (1844) p. 331.
a system in flux. Here the problem is not the apparent separation of man from nature, but the
inability to grasp and to position oneself in a moving world. * It is in this recognition of motion
and change, both in the material world and in ideas, that we realize that "[t]here is no
outside, no enclosing wall, no circumference to us."" "There is throughout nature something
mocking, something that leads us on and on, but arrives nowhere, keeps no faith with us. All
promise outruns the performance. We live in a system of approximation. Every end is
prospective of some other end, which is also temporary; a round and final success nowhere. We
are encamped in nature, not domesticated."" Yet Emerson maintians that the ability to
comprehend such instability is fundamental. "This incessant movement and progression, which
all things partake, could never become sensible to us, but by contrast to some principle of fixity
or stability in the soul.""
The poetic construction of nature thus not only connects the mind to nature through the act of
appropriating and transforming, but operates as a significant referent which renders the world
legible.
* The problem of motion is philosophically significant, for it is this recognition of movement, in
Melville's Moby Dick, for example, that leads to "the existential frustration of trying to grasp a world
in motion, a world whose movement condemns the movement of the mind to 'the everlasting
elusiveness of truth'." Unlike European existentialism, which grows out of the paradoxes of
phenomenology (the gap between objective and subjective, the irrationality of the sensate world)
Melville's American 'existentialism' stems from the recognition of change. Herbert W. Schneider,
"American Transcendentalism's Escape From Phenomenology," in Transcendentalism and its
Legacy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966) pp. 227-8.
41 "Circles" p. 181.
42 "Nature" (1844) p. 328.
4 "Circles" p. 188.
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draped surfaces which rest on the dune,
stabilizing the surface while registering/resisting
the shifting sands. Each intensifies the act of
crossing by folding together ground and sea as
one moves from one side of the dune to the
other, functioning as constructed seams along
this mobile edge.
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absolute horizontal surfaces which unfold to
meet the ground. Partially constructed and
partially draped on the landscape, these
surfaces set up an internal spatial dialogue
between the undulating space of the topography
and the horizontal extension of the ocean's
surface.
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horizon theatrecrossing
horizon theater: an existing parking lot situated on the dunes
The absolute horizontal surface slopes upward as it approaches the sea, slowly revealing
the horizon. A railing registers and fore-shadows the (in)visible horizon as one moves
toward the beach. This sets up an initial proposition concerning the making of space as a
minimal intervention within (operation on) the site that enables and intensifies one's
understanding of moving through and looking at the landscape by manipulating/qualifying
the relationship to the horizon (visually and programmatically). The surface establishes
the first mark in a relational field through which si(gh)te unfolds.
CrOSSing: a constructed passage sited at the western edge of a second parking lot
behind the dunes
Two converging walls cut through the dune, each unfolding to form two paths, one which
leads directly to the beach, and another which passes through showers and changing
facilities. This vertical cut separates the constructed surface of the parking lot from the
marsh, and marks the shift from morning to afternoon through the shadow on its surface.
The wall sets up a primary horizontal datum line in the landscape, extending the line of
the horizon across the edge of the dune. From within, however, it visually delays ones
vision of the sea until the point of arrival on the beach, an interruption, a cut, between
one side and the other.
lines of measure
lines of measure: proceeding through or around the crossing, one arrives at a
series of retaining walls situated in the sands on either side of the dune.
On the meadow edge of the dune, a set of 2 walls set up a diagonal path through the
dunes to the ocean. These walls, one resting on more stable sands and the other
constructed in a more active sand field, support a surface which allows the inhabitation
of the dunes as a room and establish a point of stability in the shifting sand. On the other
side of the dune a sea wall situated in the tidal flat introduces a interruption in the
otherwise flat surface of the beach, reiterating the edge of the dune and creating another
stratification that structures the relationship to the sea. The wall intensifies and registers
the operations of the tide, at times extending the surface of the beach and at others
creating tidal pools--reaching toward or reflecting the horizon.
room
room: on the meadow edge of the dune.
A platform peels off the top of a dune, floating above the landscape, while a lower surface
drapes over the shallow slope of the dune. Between these, 2 vertical walls structure an
interior and an exterior room, intended for public and private gatherings, with adjacent
spaces that house a caretaker's apartment, a visitor's loft, and a rehearsal space.
Although the room is visible from the parking lot on arrival, it cannot be reached without
first moving onto the beach and around a large sand dune. The room consequently
addresses the removal from and the transference of the phenomena of the sea back
across the dune's edge. A glass plane captures the reflection of the horizon on the
building as one moves from the dune onto the upper surface of the construct. The edge
of the room which faces the sea is equipped with a large door and a series of smaller
operable panels that enable the sound of the ocean to filter into the interior. On the
opposite edge of the space, a low window frames the marsh grasses, whose growth and
response to the wind evoke the changing horizon and the motion of the waves.
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appendix
qualifying horizons
Site-ing the Eye:
the cinematic landscape of \\ Grido
When someone quoted to Edgar Degas Henri Frederic Amiel's romantic phrase "A
landscape is a state of mind" the French painter retorted "No it's not. It's a state of
eye!"'
The relationship between landscapes and eyes, according to Degas, is a privileged one, for the
landscape conditions (constructs) a certain state of vision (eye) and, in turn, a specific state of
body (I). The vast space the landscape, as a site, shifts the conception of sight from one con-
cerned with objects, with the eye possessing tactile things, to one which privileges a visual field
(the scene) and therefore heightens the constructive position of the eye (the seen). Ortega Y
Gasset described this shift in vision from object to field as a move from proximate vision to
distant vision. In proximate vision, the eye is focused on a center, on objects to be consumed and
internalized. Distant vision, however, constructs a "state of eye" in which the lines of sight do not
possess but are dispersed, in which the eye traverses space.
In distant vision we do not fix the gaze on any point, but rather attempt to embrace
the whole field, including its boundaries. For this reason, we avoid focusing the
eyes as much as possible. And then we are surprised to find that the object just
perceived-our entire visual field-is concave. If we are in a house the concavity is
bordered by the walls, the form of a hemisphere viewed form within. But where
does the concavity begin? There is no possibility of doubt: it begins at our eyes
themselves.
The result is that what we see at a distance is hollow space as such. The content of percep-
tion is not strictly the surface in which the hollow space terminates, but rather the whole
hollow space itself, from the eyeball to the wall or the horizon.
This fact obliges us to recognize the following paradox: the object of sight is not farther off
in distant than in proximate vision, but on the contrary is nearer, since it begins at our
cornea. In pure distant vision, our attention, instead of being directed farther away, has
drawn back to the absolutely proximate, and the eye beam, instead of striking the
Paul Virilio, Open Sky (New York, Verso, 1997) p. 41.
convexity of a solid body and staying fixed on it, glides into a hollow.'
This is a spatially complex model of vision, for the distant and the near, inside and out collapse.2
The eye not longer sets up a dialectic (mediation) between the interior space of the mind's eye
and the world of objects, but rather occupies and moves through the space constructed by the
interaction of this eye with its object (scene). The eye constructs and moves through space,
repositioning sight not only from object to subject, but from static (passive) to trajective (active).
Landscapes are privileged si(gh)tes for this trajective vision. "With the decline in volumes and in
the expanse of landscapes, reality becomes sequential and cinematic unfolding and
1 Ortega Y Gasset, "On Point of View in the Arts," Partisan Review, XVI (August 1949) pp.
825-826.
2 Jonathan Crary discusses this shift in vision that occurred in the nineteenth century from
the camera obscura model of perception, where the a passive "eye" is positioned between the
object of vision and a distinctly interior space (of the mind), to a model of subjective vision that re-
cognized the body as a visual producer, one in which the eye/I was active in the construction of
its si(gh) the, its world. This shift fundamentally repositions the viewer and vision not as some-
thing between or mediating, but as something which connects and collapses, as well as an act
which creates rather than receives. "Once the objects of vision are coextensive with one's own
body, vision becomes dislocated and depositioned onto a single immanent plane. The bipolar
setup [between inner and outer] vanishes." Jonathan Crary, "Modernizing Vision," in Viewing
Positions: Ways of Seeing Film (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994) p. 28.
3 The term trajective vision is borrowed from Paul Virilio, who uses it to describe a state not
only of vision, but of being in the world which is outside of the objective-subjective model. "Be-
tween the subjective and the objective it seems we have not room for the 'trajective', that being of
movement from here to there, from one to the other, without which we will never achieve a
profound understanding of the various regimes of perception of the world that have succeeded
each other throughout the ages... Historically, we thus find ourselves faced with a sort of great
divide in knowing how to be in the world: on the one had, there is the original nomad for whom
the journey, the beings trajectory, are dominant. On the other, there is the sedentary man for
whom subject and object prevail, movement towards the immovable, the inert, characterizing the
sedentary urban 'civilian' in contrast to the 'warrior' nomad." Virilio, pp. 24-25.
finally gets the jump on whatever is static and on the strength of materials."' It is in the vastness
of the landscape that the eye re-vises reality not as solid and determined objects, but as a space
which is in constant flux relative to its position, one in which subject and object collapse and in
which vision becomes mobile.
It is precisely this use of landscape as a ground to investigate the repositioning (shifting) of the
eye/I relative to the scene/seen that Michelangelo Antonioni explores, both philosophically and
compositionally, in Il Grido. The film maps the landscape through Aldo, a refinery worker who,
after being rejected by his fiancee Irma, leaves town with his daughter Rosina to travel the Po
river valley in search of a new place. He is forced into a state of traversing, and the landscape
operates as a visual ground for exploring this trajective state of eye through a distant vision
which collapses eye and si(gh)te and continually drives the body into motion.
One of the first scenes of the film visually depicts his depositioning and collapse with the space of
the landscape. Aldo is working in the refinery tower when Irma arrives to deliver his lunch. He
descends the tower to meet her, but she quickly runs away. As he leaves the refinery to look for
her, a long shot frames him in front of the (distant) tower, a reminder of his previous position
above the ground. He moves across the landscape, the camera tracking his movement. The
refinery tower disappears from the frame to be replaced by a road. When Aldo arrives at this
road the camera ceases to track as he continues to move (disappear) into the background. The
scene maps a physical repositioning of his body from a point above the landscape (a static point
above) to the road (a moving body within); Aldo shifts from being a spectator to being a voyager.
The film later cuts to another long shot of figures silhouetted (flattened) against the horizon. One
of these figures moves toward the camera, descending what appears to be a slight slope in the
land. He disappears into the fog as he moves through the landscape, reappearing (emerging) in
the middle ground of the frame. We now recognize the figure as Aldo. He is no longer sited on
the horizon but is framed against the ground, having shifted from the top to the bottom of the
frame, from deep to shallow space. He continues to move parallel to the frame, the camera
tracking left to reveal a house which he then enters. This sequence continues to map Aldo's
changing position within the landscape, from being above the surface of the landscape
Ibid., p. 26-27.
'I'd',,'lJI
in the refinery tower, to being on the road (a cinematic image flattened against the horizon), and
finally to a position against the surface of the ground itself. The sequence maps not only a shift
from static point to a mobile line, but a compositional collapse of his body against the landscape.
But this changed physical condition is not just a mapping of a body within a topography, but
corresponds to (foreshadows) a changed psychological position, from one of stability to one of
uncertainty and search. When Irma reveals her desire to leave Aldo, his estrangement forces him
(mentally) into a position of flux, displacing him into the landscape to search for a new place
(position). The visual repositioning of his eye( I) in the landscape thus operates as an index to
understanding his own (psychological) state of being-in-the-world.
Now imagine a linked series of breakings' apart that take us out of ourselves, that
don't even leave 'ourselves' the time to re-form behind them, but rather throw us
beyond them, into the dry dust of the world, onto the rough earth, among things;
imagine us thus thrown back out, stranded by our very nature in a stubborn,
hostile, indifferent world...This is all it takes to finish with the cozy philosophy of
immanence in which everything happens by arrangement, by protoplasmic
exchanges, by a tepid cellular chemistry. The philosophy of transcendence throws
us onto the open road, in the midst of dangers, in a blinding light. To be, says
Heidegger, is to be in the world. Understand this "being-in" as a movement... .We
don't find ourselves in some retreat, but on the road...'
Aldo is both literally and figuratively located "on the road." His I is located narratively between
a condition of traversing (searching) and a desire for stasis (place). The film maps this paradoxi-
cal state through his changing position within in and vision of the landscape, which fluctuates
between horizon (sky) and ground, the fixed point and the moving line.
Antonioni is thus not strictly concerned with the romantic or nostalgic conception of the land-
scape as a picturesque sight, but rather as a spatial ground through which to explore the (chang-
ing) condition of the modern eye( I), that is, as a ground which structures physical and
Jean Paul Sartre, "Intentionality," in Zone 6: Incorporations (New York: Zone Books,
1992) p. 389.
psychological relationships and as a topography through which to map the depositioning of the
eye though its collapse with the scene. The Po valley presents a ground of subtle topographic
shifts between higher and lower surfaces. Roads are situated on higher ground that slopes away
at either side to a lower plane of fields with scattered houses. This edge positions the body/
camera either on or below the horizon and juxtaposes horizontal vision (out to a distant horizon)
with locating the body/camera in a state of looking up or looking down. This is evident in the
previous sequence when the camera, sitting in the lower plane of the landscape, records Aldo's
changed position from being-on (the horizon) to being-against (the ground) as he moves through
the landscape. The body and the frame oscillate from deep to shallow space in this perpetual
movement from horizon to ground.
This shifting of position relative to the ground plane recurs throughout the film, and we again see
it when Aldo is leaving his mother's house. After seeking advice about his situation with Irma,
he ascends the slope from the house onto the road (a reversal of the previous scene). The cam-
era, positioned on the road above, frames his figure against the (lower) ground. As Aldo climbs
this slope, the camera tracks left to follow his movement, revealing the road and the deep space
of the horizon. We are no longer looking down, but looking out. The space of the frame, in this
one tracking shot, has moved from shallow to deep space. Aldo stops before he reaches the road,
staring into space. A static camera frames Aldo between the slope and the road, his eye aligned
with the line of the horizon.
Paul Virilio, in Open Sky, has described the horizon as a kind of horizontal gravitational force
pulling the eye into the distance. "Rather as light from distant stars is deflected by an imposing
mass, favoring the illusion of gravitational optics, our perception of depth might well be a kind of
visual plunge, comparable to the fall of bodies in the law of universal gravitation." ' Perception
becomes a free fall into space, distancing and dislocating the eye and pulling the I into motion.
By aligning the eye with the horizon, distance is immediately attached to the eye and the far
comes to prevail over the near as a means of escape. Aldo's distant vision dislocates the body
into space, a free fall driven both by the infinite horizon and his own malaise. It is this distancing
of the eye in deep space (actually and mentally) which compels the I into a state of motion. The
whole film might be consequently be described as a mapping of this fall into the space of the
landscape through an eye( I) which is perpetually distanced in an attempt to reposition himself
1 Virilio, p. 29.
Thus the horizon does not just demarcate being above or below (on or in) but also being here or
there; Aldo is not only moving from the ground to the road, but from a state of being here to one
of being (mentally) elsewhere. His body is neither located on the road nor below in the field, but
is situated between these two spaces, gazing on the horizon. Above and below, the distant and
the near all collapse into a single space around this precariously positioned eye.
Rejected by Irma and pulled by this distant vision, Aldo begins to move through the landscape
along the Po river with Rosina. They first travel to stay with Elvia, Aldo's previous girlfriend.
Again, when he arrives, he descends from the road into the house, moving from horizon to
ground. While he attempts to reposition himself by returning to a previous relationship, to a
secure position within a vast uncertain space, he is still driven toward separation (distance),
toward motion. At one point, he withdraws from Rosina and Elvia to be alone along the banks of
the river. A long shot down the river frames a warehouse at the river's edge. Aldo is walking
toward the structure, his back to the camera. A reverse (long) shot frames Elvia and Rosina
walking toward the camera (toward Aldo). Rosina leaves Elvia's side, running toward Aldo and
disappearing from the frame. Elvia stops walking, now positioned in middle depth, her eye
aligned with the horizon. As she turns to walk away, the film cuts to a deeper shot of Aldo
leaning against the door frame of the warehouse, looking out onto the river. His eye is (initially)
aligned with the horizon and, in the distance, we see Elvia walking away. The horizon occupies a
significant role in both connecting eyes (compositionally) and in creating the distant vision that
separates them. That is, the landscape is qualified by mental space, the horizon assuming differ-
ent meanings (roles) relative to each eye. Clearly the horizon for Elvia operates not as a distanc-
ing but as a means of connecting her (literally) to Aldo. But this deep space of the horizon is
paradoxical, for while it connects them compositionally, it also divides them. Aldo's distant
vision is not fixed on Elvia but is dispersed into the deep space of the landscape, a space which
mirrors his own emptiness. While he desires stability, which he seeks not only geographically,
but in women, he is pulled by his own restlessness.
The landscape consequently becomes a paradoxical ground in which Aldo's body is constantly at
the threshold between opposing psychological and spatial conditions (far-near, depth-surface,
motion-rest). This fluctuating ground of the landscape is critical in exploring the relationship
between Rosina and Aldo as they continue to traverse the landscape after leaving Elvia. The
movement and position of each in the space of the landscape articulates the differences
between them. In one scene, Rosina runs from her father, who has embarrassed her in front of a
group of schoolchildren. The camera is located at the edge of a road, low to the ground, and we
see Rosina's solitary figure against the sky (on the horizon) in medium-long shot, moving across
the frame. Aldo appears at the edge of the frame and the camera begins to track his movement.
Rosina glances back and runs out of the frame. The film then cuts to a long shot looking down
the road. The camera is now situated slightly higher, and we see Rosina not against the sky, but
against the surface of the road. She is still running, not across the frame, but toward the distant
horizon. She stops at the edge of the road and runs down the slope to a lower field; the camera
tracks slightly to keep her in frame (she almost disappears from the left edge of the frame).
Rosina withdraws into (hides in) the space of the landscape; the tone of her coat blends perfectly
with that of the ground, causing her to visually disappear into its surface. Through the changing
camera positions (the changing position of the horizon line in the frame) and her changing
relationship to the topography, Rosina is absorbed into the ground. This is an escape not only
from Aldo, but from the horizon. It is and act both of her body and of the frame which negates
depth by asserting (withdrawing into) surface, a shift from the distant to the immediate.
This paradoxical construction between flatness and depth, ground and sky continues once Aldo
catches up with Rosina in the field. A medium shot frames Aldo kneeling next to Rosina, the
horizon high in the frame and the two positioned against the ground. Rosina points to a city
barely visible on the horizon and asks her father if they will be traveling there, her gesture to the
horizon reinforcing the gravitational pull of this deep space. Aldo stands, and the camera tracks
his motion. He is now positioned above the horizon, Rosina below; the frame locates each in a
separate space of the landscape, one shallow and one deep. He tells Rosina that cities are too
expensive and that they will find another place.
But place, as a definitive space, no longer exists for Aldo. Place in this landscape is not a destina-
tion (a static point) but merely a pause in his perpetual motion, a moment in an ever dispersed
sight of undifferentiated space. The city is a destination but his distant vision (trajective sight)
has no such object. The space of this flat, vast landscape is fundamentally different from that of
the city not only physically, but mentally, for place is no longer mathematically quantifiable but
instead has become temporal. "'We just have to accept it,' as Einstein said,'there is no fixed point
in space.' There is only the inertia of the real moment which gives shape to the living present - a
psychological timespan without which no
I______
apprehension of the world would exist, no worldly landscape."' The landscape is the spatial
manifestation of the state of non-fixity and this new understanding of place.
Rosina and Aldo next stay with Virginia, a woman they meet while Aldo is looking for work. She
owns a petrol station, and it is this place which comes to signify the changed understanding of
space that accompanies distant vision and this mobile eye( 1) in the landscape. The gas station is
not a(final) destination, but a (momentary) stoppage (pause) of motion. And even though it is
situated at a (static) point within the landscape, it is dependent on motion and conditioned by
travel. This space is qualified by another. We see this when a driver stops with a map to ask
directions to Bologna and a distant space is quite literally traversed from this 'stop' in the land-
scape (this time it is not the distant space of the horizon, but that opened up to the mind's eye by
the map). This is the nature of space for the trajective eye.
This new mode of being-in-the-world is Aldo's predicament, lived out in his fluctuating position
within the landscape and cinematically constructed through his position relative the horizon and
to the ground. Even in states of pause, he is distanced, elsewhere and in motion. The landscape
operates as a ground for exploring the difference between bodies that results from the physical
and psychological positioning of eye relative to space, as evident both in his relationship with
Elvia and with Rosina, and lastly with Andreina. Aldo meets Andreina after sending Rosina
home to live with Irma, as he continues to look for work. Again the landscape functions as a
ground for exploring the difference and distancing between the two. In one sequence, Andreina
had gone to look for Aldo. She finds him in a poor village and the two move out into the land-
scape together. A long shot of a foggy landscape establishes the si(gh)te, the horizon cutting the
frame at midpoint. Andreina enters the middle ground from right, followed by Aldo, both
figures framed below the horizon. They stop in the center of the frame, their backs turned away
from the camera. The film cuts to a reverse medium shot of the two, revealing the Po river
behind them; the horizon line now appears in the upper portion of the frame. Aldo begins
reminiscing about Ferrara (another place) and the first time he met Irma (another woman,
another time), and as he does so, he moves forward such that his eye is again aligned with the
horizon. The literal distant vision of the horizon is collapsed with a mental distancing (of an-
other). He has separated himself physically (through his position
1 Virilio, p. 32.
48
relative to the horizon) and mentally from Andreina; his mental separation is enacted through his
positioning relative to the landscape of the frame. The fall into space (distance, traversing eye)
associated with the horizon is connected with the wandering mind. Both Andreina and Aldo
turn away from the camera and the film again cuts to a reverse medium shot of the two. Aldo
moves left and the camera tracks his motion, Andreina disappearing from view. Again, Aldo is
withdrawing into his own space, away from Andreina. He talks about his job at the refinery and
remembers that from the refinery tower he could see the river and his house. Again a previous
si(gh)te (a distant vision) is collapsed within the landscape in which he is now situated. This
returns to the beginning of the film and to another position of vision in the landscape, to another
position of the eye( 1) both literally and figuratively. Aldo's eye has since changed from focusing
on things (his house, the river) to a dispersed vision of deep space; to a traversing of space in an
impossible attempt to reposition himself. The final shot of this sequence repeats the initial shot of
Aldo and Andreina, with the two figures dwarfed against the vast surfaces of the landscape,
heightening the loss of the body as a center in this empty space.
This passing description of the refinery tower is significant, for the entire film maps this position-
ing of his eye( 1) in and through the landscape. If we recall Virilio's description of the horizon as
a gravitational force, the film explores Aldo's literal fall from his position on the tower (the secure
and static eye) to one on the ground, pulled by the deep space of the horizon. The landscape, in
this state of fall, becomes a kind of continual play between juxtapositions (up-down, here-there)
that structure and reveal his mental space as well as his relationship with other bodies. The
landscape itself thus comes to spatially construct and embody the conditions of in-between; the
juxtapositions of this moving, searching, wandering, falling eye( I).
Shortly after this Aldo returns home, to the initial scene of the film, to his position on the refinery
tower. Perhaps this is an act to regain the previous state of eye, a state before being thrown into a
state of perpetual trajectory. Or perhaps it was just to realize this state of free fall in the landscape
in another way, one with definitive end.
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